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INSURANCE BINDERS REVISITED 
Peter Nash Swisher 
Temporary contracts of insurance-binders-protect the in-
sured during the time between completion of the application 
and issuance of the policy. They are an accepted and necessary 
part of the insurance business, used in connection with a wide 
variety of insurance P7:oducts. But when alleged coverage under 
a binder is the subject of litigation, the results are often incon-
sistent and, sometimes, indefensible. 
This article provides a comprehensive discussion of binders, 
including the differences between standard form and manu-
script binders, binding receipts in property and casualty insur-
ance and conditional receipts in life insurance policies, the vari-
ous kinds of conditional receipts, and otherwise. The author 
concludes with recommendations as to how to ensure greater 
consistency in binder coverage litigation. 
"Some of the more vexing and inconsistent judicial decisions regarding cov-
erage stem from cases where the insurer has not yet issued or delivered the 
actual policy and the policyholder claims coverage based on the conditional 
receipt or 'binder' it received at the time of applying for insurance."1 
1. JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LAw OF INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES§ 3.05[a] (2d ed. 1999). 
Peter Nash Swisher (pswishe"®richmond.edu) is Professor of Law at the University of 
Richmond Law School. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past three decades, there have been a number of judicial cases, 
articles,2 and treatise commentaries3 written on the law of insurance "bind-
ers" as constituting temporary contracts of insurance.4 However, with an 
alarming growth of confusing and inconsistent judicial decisions involving 
property and casualty temporary insurance binders, and life and health 
insurance conditional receipt binders, it is appropriate to reassess the un-
derlying law, theory, and practice of insurance binders involving both "stan-
dard form" and "manuscript form" policies. This article makes some mod-
est recommendations to ensure greater understanding, predictability, and 
uniformity in resolving coverage disputes involving insurance binders. 
2. See, e.g., Alan]. Pierce, 2001-2002 Survey of New York Law: Insurance Law, 53 SYR-
ACUSE L. REv. 673, 698-704 (2003); John Dwight Ingram, Life Insurance Conditional Binding 
Receipts, 48 FED'N lNs. & CoRP. CoUNSEL Q. 209 (1998); Maximilian A. Pock, Insurance, 47 
MERCER L. REv. 153, 187-89 (1995); Alan I. Widiss, Life Insurance Applications and Interim 
Coverage Disputes: Revisiting Controversies About Conditional Binding Receipts, 75 lowA L. REv. 
1097 (1990); Arnold P. Anderson, Life Insurance Conditional Receipts and Judicial Intervention, 
63 MARo. L. REv. 593 (1980). See also Annotation, Temporary life, accident, or health insurance 
pending approval of application or issuance of policy, 2 AL.R.2d 943 (1948) and later case service 
(1999 and Cum. Supp. 2003) [hereinafter Temporary life, accident, or health insurance); Anno-
tation, Temporary automobile insurance pending issuance of policy, 12 A.L.R.3d 1304 (1967 and 
Cum. Supp. 2003); Annotation, Temporary fire, wind, or hail insurance pending issuance of policy, 
14 A.L.R.3d 568 (1967 and Cum. Supp. 2003). Most of these articles have analyzed life and 
health insurance conditional receipt binders rather than property and casualty insurance 
binders. 
3. See, e.g., ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. W1mss, INSURANCE LAw § 2.3 (1988); RoBERT 
H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAw § 33 (3d ed. 2002); STEMPEL, supra note 1, 
§ 3 .05; 1 ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPl.TTES: REPRESENTATION OF INSURANCE 
COMPANIES AND INSUREDS §§ 6:36-37 (4th rev. ed. 2002). See also 3 ERIC Mitts HotMES, 
HotMEs' APPLEMAN ON INsuRANCE 2d § 10.6 (2d ed. 1998 ) [hereinafter HotMEs' APPLEMAN 
ON INSURANCE); and LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, 1 CoucH ON INSURANCE§§ 13:1-5 
(3d rev. ed. 1997) [hereinafter CoucH ON INSURANCE). 
4. JERRY, supra note 3, § 33, at 241: "Ordinarily, a binder is a document given to the 
insured that obligates the insurer to pay insurance if a loss occurs before the insurer acts upon 
the application." According to Professor Stempel, "a binder is a short-form temporary con-
tract of property or casualty insurance" and a "conditional receipt" form of insurance binder 
"is evidence of payment and prospective-but often contingent-insurance coverage in life 
and health insurance." STEMPEL, supra note 1, § 3.05, at 3-25, 26. 
Professor Arthur Leff defined a binder in this manner: 
binder. When one applies for insurance, the policy itself is not ordinarily issued until the 
application is accepted at the insurer's home office. But selling agents of the company are 
usually authorized to issue a "binder" (also called "agreement of insurance," "binding slip," 
"interim receipt," "binding receipt," "conditional binding receipt"), which will give insur-
ance protection to the applicant while the company is deciding on the application. This 
protection usually will apply unless the applicant has been guilty of fraud, material misrep-
resentation, or something similar, but in some instances [usually involving health and life 
insurance binders) the coverage is more extensively conditioned. 
Arthur Allen Leff, The Leff Dictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 YALE L.J. 1843, 2168 (1985). 
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II. INSURANCE BINDERS: AN OVERVIEW 
A binder is a temporary contract of insurance, consisting of an insurer's 
acknowledgment that it will temporarily protect the insured against a spec-
ified loss at an agreed premium until a formal policy is issued.5 Binders are 
for the convenience of the applicant, to protect the insured from a risk of 
loss during the period between the completion of the insurance application 
and the acceptance of risk by the underwriter, when the formal policy is 
issued6 (or until the rejection of the risk by the insurer).7 A binder can be 
sketchy, informal, and temporary, but it is nevertheless an enforceable in-
surance contract. 8 , 
Although the industry has not been consistent in determining the scope 
and validity of insurance binders, most courts, commentators, agents, bro-
kers, underwriters, and insurance practitioners agree that effective binders, 
expressly or impliedly, must include at least the following six elements: 
(1) identification of the insured and the insurer; (2) if a binder for property 
insurance, a description of the property; (3) the policy limits payable upon 
loss; (4) the risks covered; (5) the time in which coverage attaches under 
the terms of the binder; and ( 6) an understanding that the formal policy 
5. See, e.g., N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Meyers, 111F.3d1273 (6th Cir. 1997) (Michi-
gan law); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 481 F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1973) (New 
York and Massachusetts law); Kellner v. Aema Cas. & Sur. Co., 605 F. Supp. 331 (M.D. Pa. 
1984); Smith v. Westland Life Ins. Co., 12 3 Cal. Rptr. 649 (Cal. 197 5); Parks v. State Farm 
Ins. Co., 497 S.E.2d 575 (Ga. Ct, App. 1998); Flester v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 307 A.2d 663 
(Md. 1973). 
6. Clark v. Smith, 690 N.E.2d 604 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); Zander v. Cas. Ins. Co. of 
Cal., 66 Cal. Rptr. 561 (Ct. App. 1968). 
7. See, e.g., Turner v. Worth Ins. Co., 472 P.2d l (Ariz. 1970) (automobile insurance); 
Title Guar. Co. of Wyo. v. Midland Mortgage Co., 451 P.2d 798 (Wyo. 1969) (title insur-
ance); Anetsberger v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 14 F.3d 1226 (7th Cir. 1994) (Illinois law) (life 
insurance). See generally HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, supra note 3, § 10-6, at 25-30. 
A binder may be rejected or rescinded for a material misrepresentation or concealment in the 
application. See, e.g., Fed. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Deal, 239 F. Supp. 618 (S.D. W. Va. 1965); Klopp 
v. Keystone Ins. Co., 595 A.2d l (Pa. 1991). However, rescission may not be effective in those 
states where compulsory automobile insurance statutes only allow prospective termination of 
coverage. E.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Crouch, 706 S.W.2d 203 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1986). See generally CoucH ON INSURANCE, supra note 3, § 13:5. 
8. See, e.g., Dugan v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 736 F. Supp. 1072 (D. Kan. 1990); Nichols 
v. Prudential Ins. Co., 851 S.W.2d 657 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Hornby v. Penn. Nat'! Mut. 
Cas. Ins. Co., 303 S.E.2d 332 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983), appeal after remand, 335 S.E.2d 335 
(1985); Strickler v. Huffins, 618 A.2d 430 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). See also Turner v. Worth Ins. 
Co., 472 P.2d I (Ariz. 1970) (unless prohibited or regulated by statute, an insurance binder 
constitutes a valid contract of insurance). See generally Crouch, 706 S. W.2d at 203. See generally 
CoucH ON INSURANCE, supra note 3, §§ 13:2-7. 
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terms, conditions, and exclusions are incorporated into the binder.9 Not 
surprisingly, the last is the source of most insurance binder litigation.10 
Insurers, brokers, agents, policyholders, and legal practitioners also must 
be careful to distinguish between binding receipts in property and casualty 
insurance, which are almost always temporary contracts of insurance, and 
conditional receipts in life and health insurance, which are not always 
deemed temporary contracts unless certain conditions are met. 
For example, property and casualty insurance agents normally are gen-
eral agents who have the power to bind their principal insurance companies 
to temporary insurance binders, absent any express limitation to their 
agency powers. Life insurance agents, on the other hand, are only soliciting 
agents who normally do not have the power to create temporary insurance 
coverage with a life or health insurance policy, absent approval by the in-
surance company's home office. 11 So life and health insurance agents can 
give insurance applicants only conditional, rather than binding, receipts. 12 
There are other important underlying reasons for the differences be-
tween property and casualty insurance temporary binders and life and 
health insurance conditional receipt binders. In property and casualty cov-
erages, a general agent normally is able to physically inspect the property 
and risk of loss, and most agents possess reasonably good field judgment 
9. See, e.g.,}ERRY, supra note 3, § 33, at 241-42; STEMPEL, supra note 1, § 3.05, at 3-30, 
31; HoLMEs' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, supra note 3, § 10.6, at 32-33; CoucH ON INSURANCE, 
supra note 3, §§ 13:10-12. If any of these necessary elements are missing, a binder may not 
be enforceable. See, e.g., Brody v. Chenango Mut. Ins. Co., 686 N.Y.S.2d 488, 489 (App. Div. 
1999) (because the parties did not specify the effective date of coverage for fire insurance, 
nor indicate the terms and duration of coverage, the insurance application did not constirute 
an enforceable binder). See also Lindsay Ins. Co. v. Mead, 508 N.W.2d 820 (Neb. 1993) (a 
mere application for insurance did not constirute a binder if the parties did not agree on the 
essential elements of the binder); Bowers v. Mut. Ins. Co., 670 N.Y.S.2d 274 (N.Y. 1998) 
(there was no enforceable binder because there was no meeting of the minds as to which 
insurance carrier was to insure the property in question). 
10. See, e.g., Westchester Resco Co. v. New England Reins. Corp., 648 F. Supp. 842, 843 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), ajf d, 818 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1987) (New York law): 
The facts in this case are an object lesson in how not to make a contract. Although all the 
parties involved were apparently acting according to the general practice in the insurance 
industry, the rounds of letters, telegrams, binders, and policy terms that were sent in various 
directions among the two parties and their brokers make it difficult indeed to determine 
whether or not minds ever met. 
11. An insurance binder is not valid if the agent does not have acrual or apparent authority 
to act on behalf of the principal insurance company. See, e.g., N. Assurance Co. v. Lark, 845 
F. Supp. 1301 (S.D. Ind. 1993), aff'd, 17 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying Indiana law). But 
see Weaver v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 545 F. Supp. 74 (E.D. Mo. 1982) (finding apparent au-
thority of a life insurance agent based upon "sales aids" materials provided to the applicant 
by the principal insurer); Service v. Pyramid Life Ins. Co., 440 P.2d 944 (Kansas 1968) (finding 
implied or apparent authority of an agent to bind the company by an oral contract for life 
insurance). 
12. See generally EMERIC FISCHER, PETER N. SWISHER & JEFFREY STEMPEL, PRINCIPLES OF 
INsuRANcE LAw, § 4.2 (3d ed. 2004). 
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concerning possible hazards to the insurer. Much greater expertise and 
judgment are required to ascertain a life or health insurance risk. Moreover, 
property and casualty insurance policies generally are renewed on an an-
nual basis, where life insurance coverage can last a lifetime.13 Professor 
Stempel clarifies these important distinctions: 
The conditional receipt and binder are not only distinguished by language and 
intended use but also by the types of insurance and underwriting environments 
in which they appear ... [f]he conditional receipt is most common in life and 
health insurance, particularly life. The contingent language of the receipt al-
lows the insurer room to "back out" of the nearly completed transaction if the 
prospective policyholder does not pass the underwriting process due to flunk-
ing a physical, having inaccurate application answers, and so on. Because of 
the nature of life and health insurance, the underwriting process takes place 
away from the "point of sale" and requires a significant time period for re-
searching medical history and arranging physical exams. 
By contrast, property and casualty insurance can often be underwritten in the 
field through visual inspections by the insurance agent. Even if further inquiry 
is required before the insurer will commit to a full-fledged insurance policy, 
it usually has enough confidence in property/casualty risks to offer the tem-
porary insurance of a binder. 14 
III. PROPERTY AND CASUAL TY INSURANCE BINDERS 
Binders for property and casualty insurance such as fire insurance, auto-
mobile insurance, homeowners insurance, and commercial property insur-
ance may be oral or written, and founded on the words or deeds of an 
agent. Statements made by a general agent such as "You're covered" or 
"I'll take care of it" have been held to constitute valid oral binders. 15 So 
long as the requisite six elements are present, 16 a binder can and will be 
found. 
In one illustrative case, a building contractor telephoned a property and 
casualty insurance agent, who represented a number of insurance compa-
nies, to obtain a builder's risk insurance policy. The agent orally told the 
contractor over the telephone that "he was covered." After this telephone 
13. See 5,6 HoLMEs' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, supra note 3, §§ 25-26, 36-38. 
14. STEMPEL, supra note 1, § 3:05[a], at 3-26. 
15. See, e.g., Am. Universal Ins. Co. v. Kruse, 306 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1962); State Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. Babcock, 220 N.W2d 717 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974); Dixie Ins. Co. v. Joe Works 
Chevrolet, Inc., 7 66 S.W2d 4 (Ark. 1989); Progressive Preferred Ins. Co. v. Davis, 405 S.E.2d 
529 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991); Zanninni v. Reliance Ins. Co., 590 N.E.2d 457 (Ill. 1992). 
16. See W1NDT, supra note 3, § 6:36 (in the event a claim arises before the actual policy 
is issued, the general rule is that the binder provides only as much coverage as the policy 
would have provided; one who accepts a binder accepts all the terms of the underlying in-
surance contract). 
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conversation, the agent scribbled the words "Insure 7750 Van Buren 
[Street] same as 7730" on a piece of paper. The court held that this action 
constituted a valid and enforceable binder for temporary insurance 
coverage. 17 
Like any contract, property and casualty insurance contracts must be 
supported by consideration. 18 This general rule is somewhat altered when 
an insurance binder is involved, because a valid and enforceable binder can 
be issued prior to the first premium payment. 19 
For commercial policyholders, the practice of the uidustry in creating 
property and casualty binders is far from consistent. Sometimes policy-
holders rely on the oral representations of a broker or an agent. Sometimes 
commitment letters are sent. Sometimes agents or brokers create a binder 
over the telephone or via e-mail. In some cases, a policyholder will procure 
insurance through a broker, and the broker and the insured will agree on 
the immediate attachment of temporary insurance through an informal 
binder while the insured's request for a formal policy is being reviewed by 
the insurer or lead insurer. In other cases, the insurer will insist upon using 
a written confirmation for any property or casualty insurance application.20 
This problem becomes complex, of course, when a loss is incurred before 
the formal policy is issued: 
The insured may, in that event, contend, if the polic;y was prepared before the 
loss, that the policy terms are unreasonable, and if the policy was still being 
prepared at the time of loss, that the insurer prepared it in a certain manner 
in order to exclude coverage.21 
Under these circumstances, the validity of the binder, and the underlying 
policy terms and conditions, should be governed by whether they are cus-
tomary. to the insurance industry, as evidenced by reference to standard 
17. See Julian v. Spring Lake Park Agency, Inc., 166 N.W.2d 355 (Minn. 1969). See also 
Granco Steel, Inc. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 65 Cal. Rptr. 287 (Cal. 1968). On the 
other hand, when an insurance agent represents only one insurer, the designation of such 
insurer becomes superfluous, and the insurer's liability commences on the date of the agent's 
oral binder. Zanderv. Cas. Ins. Co. of Cal., 66 Cal. Rptr. 561 (Ct. App. 1968). Compare Bowers 
v. Merch. Mut. Ins. Co., 670 N.Y.S.2d 274 (N.Y. 1998) (no oral binder was established where 
there was no meeting of the minds as to which insurance carrier would insure the property 
in question). 
18. See, e.g., Am. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. BIM Inc., 885 F.2d 132 (4th Cir. 1989) 
(applying W. Va. law); Statewide Ins. Co. v. Dewar, 694 P.2d 1164 (Ariz. 1984). 
19. See generally HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, supra note 3, § 10.6, at 30; CoucH 
ON INSURANCE, supra note 3, § 13:11 (both citing as authority Joe Works Chevrolet, 766 S.W.2d 
at 4). See also Kellner v. Aema Cas. & Sur. Co., 605 F. Supp. 331 (D.C. Pa. 1984). The validity 
of a binder likewise is not dependent on the actual payment of a premium when the applicant 
agrees to pay the premium bill when later rendered by the insurer. See, e.g., Strickler v. 
Huffins, 618 A.2d 430 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). 
20. See generally STEMPEL, supra note 1, § 3.05, at 3-28 to 29. 
21. WINDT, supra note 3, § 6:36, at 800. 
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policy terms, rate schedules, and expert testimony. 22 Thus, a temporary 
property and casualty insurance binder, although it may be sketchy, infor-
mal, and incomplete, will be merged into the terms and conditions of the 
formal insurance policy that is subsequently issued.23 But how will the par-
ties be able to identify exactly what terms and conditions are part of this 
underlying policy? 
In the definitive case of Westchester Resco Co. v. New England Reinsurance 
Corp.,24 the trial judge recognized that in New York, as in most American 
jurisdictions, the unique nature of insurance binders justifies a special 
approach: 
Daily, important affairs and rights in our society are made to depend upon 
[insurance binders]. It is a common and necessary practice in the world of 
insurance, where speed is often of the essence, for the agent to use this quick 
and informal device to record the giving of protection pending the execution 
.and delivery of a more conventionally detailed policy of insurance.25 
But although a binder alone is sufficient to establish coverage, "the deal 
is not completely done until the policy is issued. "26 So, if loss occurs after 
an incomplete and sketchy binder has been issued, but before a formal 
policy is issued, courts normally will infer the usual terms of contemplated 
coverage, on the assumption that "many policy clauses are either stereo-
types or mandated by public regulation."27 Thus, standard form policy 
terms, conditions, and limitations will be inferred to be part of the usual 
terms of the insurance binder that is later merged into an underlying in-
22. Id. See also Westchester Resco Co. v. New England Reins. Corp., 648 F. Supp. 842 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 818 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1987) (New York law); DiSanto v. Enstrom Hel-
icopter Corp., 489 F. Supp. 1352 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Pine Ridge Realty Inc. v. Mass. Bay Ins. 
Co., 752 A.2d 595 (Maine 2000); Terry v. Mongin Ins. Agency, 306 N.W.2d 270 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1981). 
23. See, e.g., King v. Allstate Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1990); Hartford Ins. Co. 
v. Shapiro, 117 So. 2d 348 (Ala. 1960); Chevron Oil Co. v. Indus. Comm'n of Colo., 456 P.2d 
735 (Colo. 1969). See also Brister v. Gulf Cent. Pipeline Co., 618 F. Supp. 104, 110 (W,D. 
La. 1985), aff'd, 788 F.2d 1564 (5th Cir. 1986) ("it is hombook insurance law that a binder 
merges into the subsequently issued policy so that the terms and conditions of the policy, in 
case of conflict or ambiguity, are controlling"); Kellner v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 605 F. Supp. 
331, 333 (M.D. Pa. 1984) (a binder is a "complete, temporary, or preliminary contract" ef-
fective from the time it is issued until "issuance of the formal policy or until rejection of the 
risk"); COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 3, § 13:8. 
24. 648 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 818 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1987) (New York law) 
(involving completed operations insurance coverage). 
25. Id. at 845 (quoting Employers Union Ins. Co. v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 412 
N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (N.Y. 1978)). 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
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surance policy, when such terms, conditions, or limitations have not been 
bargained over by the parties. 28 
There is a persuasive public policy rationale for inferring binder terms 
from standard form policies-that is, because such referrals bring with 
them the beneficial effects of uniformity and predictability: 
In the ambit of property and casualty insurance, there are reams of standard-
ized forms that are used almost universally in the insurance industry. These 
forms are created and copyrighted by Insurance Services Offices, Inc. which 
seeks regulatory approval so that the ISO coverage forms may be used in the 
several states. The ISO forms are periodically revised to meet problems in the 
industry particularly regarding breaking issues. The policy forms so promul-
gated are, in reality, a set of forms to be assembled to create the entire contract 
of insurance. Thus, numerous endorsements are created to meet the particu-
larities of each state's law. This provides for a high degree of uniformity among 
insurers with respect to a particular type of coverage.29 
However, not all property and casualty binders are based on standardized 
policy forms. In the alternative, a property or casualty insurance binder 
and its underlying policy may be a manuscript form: 
Large corporate insureds ... often have specific concerns and, coupled with 
their economic clout derived from the substantial amounts of premiums paid, 
often negotiate specific policy provisions with the insurer. When the standard 
contract forms are not used, the parties may have extensive discussions over 
the particulars of the language used and such policies are called "manuscript" 
policies. In these situations, there is no standardization and therefore the 
wealth of case law may be of limited utility in interpreting the manuscript 
policy language after disputes arise.30 
This distinction between manuscript and standard form binders and poli-
cies is important. Although a number of courts have held that certain ste-
reotypical standard form policy terms and provisions may be read into a 
property and casualty insurance binder, manuscript form policy terms and 
provisions may be an important exception to this general rule. 31 
28. See, e.g., Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 667 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1981) (Minnesota 
law) (although a binder did not contain a deductible and damage occurred before the formal 
policy was issued, the insured nevertheless was bound by a policy deductible provision because 
such a provision was "an ordinary term" in policies issued by similar insurance carriers for 
similar risks ofloss); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Bonsera, Inc., 675 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Sup. Ct. 1998) 
(a provision in a final insurance policy that was not bargained for in the binder would not be 
effective unless the evidence demonstrated that such a provision is standard in the industry 
or was standard in policies issued by the particular insurer). See also N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co. 
v. Meyers, 111F.3d1273 (6th Cir. 1997) (Michigan law); and Acadia Ins. Co. v. Allied Marine 
Transport LLC, 151 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D. Me. 2001). 
29. 1 HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, supra note 3, § 2.1, at 190-91. 
30. Id. at 191. 
31. See, e.g., Westchester Resco Co. v. New England Reins. Corp., 648 F. Supp. 842, 
845-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 818 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1987) (completed operations coverage 
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How should a coun interpret a property or casualty insurance binder 
that contains a provision such as: "Manuscript form to be agreed upon," when 
loss occurs after the binder is issued but before the parties have negotiated 
the final terms of their manuscript form policy? This interpretative co-
nundrum was an important pan of the consolidated litigation arising out 
of several legal actions entitled SR International Business Insurance Co. v. 
World Trade Center Properties LLC,32 involving the horrific attack on the 
World Trade Center in New York City on September 11, 2001, that 
"changed many aspects of insurance coverage forever."33 
The World Trade Center complex was leased by the Pon Authority of 
New York and New Jersey for ninety-nine years to various business entities 
controlled by Larry Silverstein and incorporated as the World Trade Cen-
ter Properties LLC (also known as the Silverstein parties). The Silverstein 
parties secured property insurance coverage on the World Trade Center 
buildings from more than twenty insurers, excess insurers, reinsurers, and 
dispute) ("In essence the [New York] Court of Appeals [in Employers Commercial Union 
Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 412 N.Y.S. 2d 121, 124 (N.Y.1978)] has determined 
that there are two distinct types of terms in an insurance contract: the terms unique to the 
deal, over which the parties bargain and memorialize in a binder; and the terms that are the 
'usual' or 'stereotypical' conditions and limitations which are not bargained over and which 
are spelled out fully for the first time in the policy. Therefore, in trying to divine the meaning 
of the contract with regard to unique features of coverage, the first place to look is the 
binder."). See also Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. C.A. Feaseguradora Nacional de Venezuela, 
802 F. Supp. 1069, 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 991 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(reinsurance coverage dispute) ("I interpret [Employers Commercial Union] to mean that if 
terms may fairly be characterized as 'usual' or 'stereotypical,' they form a part of the policy 
even if not referred to in the binder; if not, not."). 
See also N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Myers, 111 F.3d 1273, 1278 (6th Cir. 1997) (Michigan 
law) ("all ordinary provisions and exclusions of policies issued to cover similar risks will be 
read into the temporary binder unless there was an express agreement at the time of the 
issuance of the binder which would make such provisions and exclusions inconsistent with 
the intent of the binder agreement"); Acadia Ins. Co. v. Allied Marine Transport LLC, 151 
F. Supp. 2d 107, 125 (D. Maine 2001) ("the general rule regarding the terms of an oral binder 
or contract of temporary insurance pending issuance of a written policy consists, in the ab-
sence of a special agreement, of the usual provisions of contracts employed to effect like 
insurance"). 
A manuscript form binder and policy would constitute such a special agreement between 
the parties, and thus is an exception to this general rule. 
32. 222 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), ajj'd, 345 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003) (New York 
law). 
33. See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Thelnsurance Aftermath of September 11, 2001: Myriad 
Claims, Multiple Lines, Arguments over Occurrence Counting, ~r Risk Exclusions, the Future of 
Terrorism Coverage, and the New Issues of Government Role, 37 ToRT & lNs. L.J. 817, 817 (2002). 
The author served as an expert wimess for one of the twenty-two insurance companies 
involved in this litigation. Many court documents, depositions, and other materials are still 
under a confidentiality order imposed by the trial court. Any information within this article 
concerning the World Trade Center property insurance coverage dispute has been gleaned 
from public sources and public records, not from confidential or sealed documents. 
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Lloyd's syndicates with a primary layer of coverage and eleven excess layers 
of coverage, totaling approximately $3.5 billion per occurrence.34 By Sep-
tember 11, "over twenty individual insurance companies had signed binders 
which obligated them to provide property damage insurance, but, with 
minor exceptions, they had not issued formal insurance policies."35 
· A number of these property insurance binders stated that the underlying 
policy terms and conditions to be agreed upon by the parties would be a 
manuscript form, using such language as "Manuscript form to be submit-
ted,"36 "this authorization would be subject to review and acceptance of the 
finalized manuscript form,"37 and "Manuscript form to be agreed."38 
The underlying terms and conditions of these binders were therefore of 
crucial importance to both the Silverstein Parties and to the insurers, and 
particularly so the definition of "occurrence." The Silverstein Parties had 
argued that two different airplanes hitting two different World Trade Cen-
ter towers, coming from two different airports, constituted two occurrences 
that would, in effect, raise the coverage from $3.5 billion (for one occur-
rence) to approximately $7 billion (for two). The insurance companies ar-
gued that the World Trade Center attack was a single, highly coordinated 
al Qaida terrorist attack, and therefore constituted only one occurrence.39 
The court rejected the Silverstein parties' assertion that the property 
· insurance binders on the World Trade Center were only a "binding pre-
liminary commitment": 
An insurance binder is a unique type of contract. While not all the terms of 
the insurance contract are set forth in the binder, "[a] binder is a present. 
contract of insurance." ... The terms of a binder are not left to future nego-
tiation .... The law of New York [and elsewhere] with respect to binders does 
not look to the negotiations of the. parties to see what terms might ultimately 
have been incorporated into a formal policy. Nor does it suggest that the 
parties will not be bound if they fail to agree on important terms after nego-
tiating in good faith. To the contrary, the New York Court of Appeals has 
34. See Pierce, supra note 2, at 698-99; Stempel, supra note 33, at 832-43. The total 
value of insured losses due to the collapse of the World Trade Center, excluding life insurance, 
is estimated to total at least $35 billion, perhaps as high as $75 billion. Id. at 818 . 
. 35. World Trade Ctr., 222 F. Supp. 2d at 387. 
36. Id. at 392. 
37. Id. at 393. 
38. Id. at 396. 
39. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 33, at 836: 
Where the cause of loss is part of a system or policy, courts have found but one occur-
rence .... These precedents provide some support to the WTC insurers that undoubtedly 
will argue that the September 11th terrorism emanates from but one al Qaida/bin Laden 
master plan. Although this appears to be true, the fact remains that the plan had two rather 
discrete and separate episodes: driving one plane into the North Tower and driving a 
completely separate plane, operated by another airline and crew, into the South Tower, 
both planes commandeered in separate hijackings rather than launched as parts of one fleet. 
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made clear that when a binder is signed, "the contract of insurance is closed, 
and the binder [becomes] in effect the same as a regular insurance policy .... "40 
But what was the underlying property insurance policy in the World Trade 
Center case? There were two possibilities: (1) a Wi1Prop2000 insurance 
policy form, which was submitted by some brokers to some insurance com-
panies as an initial model for their subsequent manuscript form policies, 
and that included a definition of occurrence; and (2) a Traveler's Insurance 
Company policy form, submitted by other brokers to other insurance com-
panies as the probable lead policy that did not include a definition of 
occurrence.41 
The Silverstein Parties argued that at the time the insurers signed the 
binders, they were 
well aware that they were committing themselves to participate in a process 
in which they would ultimately agree to be bound to the contract terms ne-
gotiated by the insureds and the lead underwriter, which in this case became 
the Travelers Insurance Company. Thus, the Silverstein Parties argue that as 
of September 11th, each of these insurers was bound to the terms to which 
Travelers and the insureds had agreed as of that date.42 
Three insurance companies-Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Royal 
Indemnity Company, and St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company-
argued that at the time each insurer issued its binder, it agreed to be bound 
on the basis of an underlying draft insurance form-the Wi1Prop2000 
form-provided by Willis of New York, Inc., broker for the Silverstein 
parties, and that under the definition therein, the terrorist attack on the 
World Trade Center was unambiguously a single occurrence:43 
"Occurrence" shall mean all losses or damages that are attributable directly or 
indirectly to one cause or to one series of similar causes. All such losses will 
be added together and the total amount of such losses will be treated as one 
occurrence irrespective of the period of time or area over which such~losses 
occur.44 
The Silverstein parties further argued that the WilProp2000 definition of 
occurrence could be construed so that two planes hitting two World Trade 
Center Towers within sixteen minutes would not constitute "one series of 
similar occurrences,"45 but Judge Martin rejected this argument as well: 
40. SR Int'l Bus. Ins. Co. v. World Trade Ctr. Prop. LLC, 222 F. Supp. 2d 385, 388-89 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd, 345 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003). 
41. See Stempel, supra note 33, at 837-43; Pierce, supra note 2, at 698-704. 
42. World Trade Ctr., 222 F. Supp. 2d at 388. 
43. Id. at 387. 
44. Id. at 398. 
45. Id. The Silverstein parties, quoting Professor Stempel, supra note 33, at 838-43, 
argued that even applying the Wilprop2000 definition, there may well have been more than 
one occurrence. 
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Under New York law, the terms of an insurance policy are interpreted from 
the vantage point of the "average person on the street." When interpreting a 
"specialized business policy", however, "the average person is not the house-
wife purchasing flight insurance, but the average purchaser of broad business 
liability insurance." ... complex comprehensive general liability policies issued 
to large corporate manufacturers ... should be viewed as if by a reasonably 
intelligent business person who is familiar with the agreement and with the 
industry in question. Normally, the court can put itself in this position, so that 
expert evidence need not be submitted:" 
While an academic may be able to come up with a strained meaning for the 
definition of "occurrence" in the WilProp Form, "common speech" and the 
"reasonable expectation and purpose of the ordinary businessman" can not. 
The ordinary businessman would have no doubt that when two hijacked planes 
hit the Twin Towers in a sixteen minute period, the total destruction of the 
World Trade Center resulted from "one series of similar causes."46 
The court also rejected St. Paul's claim that it had never been bound by a 
formal written binder, according to the insurer's usual custom and practice, 
"given the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, including the fact that 
St. Paul billed and collected the premium for the coverage."47 
Thus, because these three insurance companies had bound themselves 
on the basis of the Wi1Prop2000 policy form, and because the WilProp 
definition of occurrence was susceptible to only one meaning, each insurer 
was, as a matter of law, liable only for one payment in the face amount of 
its policy.48 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed: 
In deciding which terms are to be implied in a binder, reliance may be placed 
on the extrinsic evidence of the parties' particular negotiations. In particular, 
we believe that any policy form [such as the Wilprop2000 policy form] that 
was exchanged in the process of negotiating the binder, together with any 
express modifications to that form, is likely the most reliable manifestation of 
the terms by which the parties intended to be bound while the binder was in 
effect. In the absence of such a policy form underlying the negotiations or 
sufficient extrinsic evidence of the negotiations to determine the parties' in-
tentions, the terms to be implied would likely be the customary terms of the 
insurer's own form ... unless there is evidence indicating that an understand-
46. SR Int'! Bus. Ins. Co. v. World Trade Ctr. Prop. LLC, 222 F. Supp. 2d 385, 398-99 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), ajj'd, 345 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003) at 398-99. 
47. Id. at 397 n.4. However, there is also authority in New York and elsewhere that the 
doctrines of waiver and estoppel ought not to be available to bring within coverage any risks 
that were not covered in the first place. See, e.g., Annotation, Doctrine of Estoppel or Wiliver as 
Available to Bring Within Coverage of Insurance Policy Risks Not Covered by Its Terms or &pressly 
Excluded Therefrom, l A.L.R.3d 1139, 1144, 1147-49 (1965) and 2003 Cumulative 
Supplement. 
48. World Trade Ctr., 222 F. Supp. 2d at 399. 
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ing existed between the parties that a different policy form would apply to the 
binder and that the insurer was aware of its terms.49 
Thirteen other insurers, excess insurers, and reinsurers allegedly in-
formed by their brokers that the Travelers' policy was the "follow form" 
lead policy, however, are experiencing much more complex insurance cov-
erage issues, as "occurrence" was never defined within the Travelers' lead 
policy, and New York case law may embrace a view of "occurrence" and 
multiple "occurrences" that may be more favorable to the World Trade 
Center policyholders than under the Wi1Prop2000 form, unless these in-
surers are able to successfully argue in court that the underlying Wil-
Prop2000 policy definition applied to them as well.50 
In the World Trade Center coverage dispute, therefore, numerous 
manuscript form binders were found to be based on two different under-
lying policies: the Wi1Prop2000 form and the Travelers' property insurance 
policy. What if a number of these same insurers had agreeH to "manuscript 
form" binders, but the parties had not agreed on any underlying policy 
terms or conditions? What then? Should the court resort to other stan-
dardized or stereotypical property or casualty insurance provisions to infer 
the underlying terms and conditions to coverage for a final policy? Or 
should the court find that there was no "meeting of the minds" as to exactly 
what the "manuscript form" binder and policy should include in the first 
place? In this situation, "there is no standardization, and therefore the 
wealth of case law may be of limited utility in interpreting the manuscript 
policy language after disputes arise."51 
49. World Trade Center Properties LLC v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 345 F.3d 154, 169-
70 (2d Cir. 2003) (New York law). 
50. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 33, at 835-38 (citing Arthur A Johnson Corp. v. lndem. 
Ins. Co., 64 N.E.2d 704 (N.Y. 1959), and other illustrative cases, all finding multiple occur-
rences within a short period of time that triggered higher property and casualty insurance 
coverage than a single occurrence). 
An Associated Press article, however, reported that Swiss Re attorney Barry Ostrager said 
in his opening statement in federal district court on February 9, 2004, that Larry Silverstein's 
risk manager, Robert Strachan, allegedly negotiated numerous policies in July of 2001 with 
Swiss Re and other insurers that used the Wi!Prop2000 definition of "occurrence" under 
which the destruction of the World Trade Center twin towers constituted only a single oc-
currence. RicH. UMEs-D1sPATCH, Feb. IO, 2004, at C-6. 
Moreover, on September 12, 2001, Mr. Strachan allegedly faxed the Wi!Prop definition of 
"occurrence" to a key governmental agency and stated that the World Trade Center was 
"underinsured." The Silverstein parties have argued that Mr. Strachan was "confused," was 
"acting under extreme stress," and was "out of the loop" with day-to-day involvement in the 
process. Swiss Re countered that Mr. Strachan in fact "was singularly responsible" for the 
World Trade Center insurance, and by his own testimony "spent 7 5 % to 80%" of his time 
on the matter during the summer of 2001. Swiss Re has called Mr. Silverstein's two-
occurrence argument "a self-motivated hoax," and Mr. Silverstein has accused Swiss Re of 
"cynical and manipulative tactics" and "scurrilous" personal attacks, and of "shirking its re-
sponsibilities to both the policyholders and lower Manhattan." See, e.g., Dean Starkman, Exec's 
Scribbles May Cut Amount of WTC Payout, WALL ST.}., Feb. 4, 2004, at B-1, B-6, available at 
http://homes.wsj.com/regionalnews/northeast/20040213-starkman.htrnl. 
51. l HoLMEs' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, supra note 3, § 2.1, at 191. 
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Accordingly, the better view is that if the parties contract through a 
manuscript form binder, but there is no underlying model or draft policy 
terms or conditions to support it, then there is no meeting of the minds 
and the binder is invalid and unenforceable. Therefore, whether the parties 
are negotiating a "standard form" or "manuscript form" type property or 
casualty insurance binder, they must agree upon some "draft" or "model" 
terms and conditions that may be inferred to be part of the policy. 
In the absence of such underlying stereotypical policy terms and con-
ditions for "standard form" binders, and in the absence of any underlying 
"draft" or "model" policy terms and conditions for "manuscript form" 
binders, insurance applicants, brokers, agents, and underwriters negotiate 
at their peril regarding the binders' validity and enforceability. 
IV. LIFE INSURANCE CONDITIONAL RECEIPT BINDERS 
Life and health insurance companies also issue binders. When the applicant 
for life insurance is informed by his agent that it may be weeks or months 
before his application is finally acted upon by the home office, that appli-
cant may become too apprehensive or exasperated to complete and submit 
it. Thus, life and health insurance companies have responded in a variety 
of ways, and with a variety of binders, as sales aids to retain their applicants' 
business.52 
Life and health insurance binders differ significantly from property and 
casualty binders. The latter often may be underwritten in the field through 
a visual inspection of the property by an experienced general agent; and 
even if further inquiry is required before the insurer will commit to a formal 
. policy, the company usually has enough confidence in its agents, and in 
the specific property and casualty risks, to offer temporary binder cover-
age. 53 In addition, if the risk potential or the premium rate experiences 
significant change, most property and casualty companies can adjust their 
premium rate, their coverage, or their limitations to coverage accordingly, 
because property and casualty policies are generally renewed on an annual 
or a semiannual basis. 
Life and health insurance binders, however, generally involve only con-
ditional rather than binding temporary coverage, based upon the insurer's 
need for a comprehensive underwriting process involving research of medi-
cal history and often a physical examination. Moreover, assuming that the 
insured pays the premiums on time or within a statutory grace period,54 
52. See, e.g., Widiss, supra note 2, at 1097-98; Anderson, supra note 2, at 593. 
53. STEMPEL, supra note 1, § 3.05, at 3-26. 
54. Every modem life insurance policy, and many other kinds of personal insurance pol-
icies, normally have a thirty- or thirty-one-day grace period in which to pay an overdue 
premium. See )ERRY, supra note 3, § 72, at 623-26. 
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and that the contestability period has passed,55 a life insurance policy can 
literally last a lifetime. Consequently, a life and health insurance "binder" 
generally is only a conditional receipt binder, rather than a temporary bind-
ing contract of insurance.56 
Conditional receipt binders fall within one of three categories: 
(1) approval-type conditional receipts, where no insurance coverage comes 
into effect until the application has actually been approved at the insurer's 
home office; (2) satisfaction-type conditional receipts, where insurance 
coverage takes effect only if, under the insurer's objective underwriting 
standards, and normally based upon a later physical examination, the pro-
spective insured was an acceptable risk at the time of the application; and 
(3) unconditional temporary or interim insurance during the pendency of 
the application.57 
A. Approval-1jpe Conditional Receipts 
Approval-type conditional receipts generally provide that no coverage will 
come into effect until the application has been approved by an authorized 
official at the company's home office.58 The traditional approval-type con-
ditional receipt is based on a literal and formalistic59 interpretation of the 
55. Every life insurance contract, and most health insurance contracts, contain incon-
testability clauses. Such clauses, often required by state statute, provide that after the policy 
has been in force for two years, the policy's validity will become "incontestable." Id.§ 104B, 
at 825-27. 
56. See generally Comment, Life Insurance Receipts: The Mystery of the Non-Binding Binder, 
63 °YALE L.J. 523 (1954) [hereinafter Life Insurance Receipts]. See also JERRY, supra note 3, § 33, 
at 245 ("The main reason for this disparity [between property and casualty insurance binders 
and life and health insurance conditional receipts J is that less expertise is needed to inspect 
property adequately than to evalullte a person's health."). 
57. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 593; Life Insurance Receipts, supra note 56, at 528; Peter 
N. Swisher, Judicial Interpretations of Insurance Contract Disputes: Toward a Realistic Middle 
Ground Approach, 57 OHIO ST. LJ. 543, 606-609 (1996). See also JERRY, supra note 3, § 33[c], 
at 243-45; Temporary Life, Accident, or Health Insurance, supra note 2. 
A conditional receipt is not effective under any of these three approaches unless the first 
premium has been paid with the application. See, e.g., Wright v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 379 F.2d 
409 (4th Cir. 1967). 
58. See, e.g., W. VANCE, HANnsooK ON THE LAw OF INSURANCE,§ 40, at 239 (3d Anderson 
ed. 1951); Life Insurance Receipts, supra note 56, at 532-34; Temporary Life, Accident, or Health 
Insurance, supra note 2, § 11, at 963-67. 
59. Legal formalism is the traditional view that correct legal decisions are determined by 
preexisting judicial and legislative precedent, and the rule of law is viewed as a complete, 
autonomous system of logical, socially neutral principles and rules. Judging under this for-
malistic theory is thus a matter of logical necessity rather than a matter of choice. See, e.g., 
Frederick Shauer, Formalism, 97 °YALE L.J. 509 (1988) (discussing how legal formalism still 
serves a legitimate function in limiting judicial discretion and judicial activism). 
In an insurance law context, legal formalism is exemplified by the seminal writings of 
Professor Samuel Williston on Ainerican contract law in general, and insurance law in par-
ticular. The bedrock principle underlying Williston's formalistic view is that an insurance 
application or policy must be construed and enforced according to general principles of con-
tract law, and courts are not at liberty to reinterpret or modify the terms of a clearly written 
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contract language: that the insurance application represents a mere offer 
on the part of the applicant and that approval of this offer by the life or 
health insurance company is necessary to constitute a valid acceptance. 60 
For example, in Bedgood v. Woodman of the World Life lnmrance Co.,61 the 
Georgia Court of Appeals held that an application that stated "No insur-
ance will be in force because of this application until it has been approved 
and at least one monthly premium has been paid" was unambiguously an 
approval-type conditional receipt that required approval from the insurer's 
home office, and not approval by the insurer's field representative, who 
was only a soliciting agent.62 
Although approval-type conditional receipts were once the most com-
mon form of life and health insurance conditional receipts,63 a growing 
number of functionalist64 judges and commentators have criticized and re-
and unambiguous insurance policy but must look at the plain meaning thereof. See 2 SAMUEL 
WILLISTON, THE LAw OF CONTRACTS, § 6:3 (4th ed. 1998). See also Peter Nash Swisher, A 
Realistic Consensus Approach to the Insurance Law Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 3 5 ToRT & 
INS. L.J. 729, 748-52 (2000). 
60. See, e.g., Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Young, 90 U.S. 85 (1875); Hill v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 
181 S.E. 104 (Ga. Ct. App. 1935); Hyder v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 190 S.E. 239 (S.C. 1937); 
Kronjaeger v. Travelers Ins. Co., 22 S.E.2d 689 (W Va. 1942); Union Life Ins. Co. v. Rhine-
hart, 315 S.W.2d 920 (Ark. 1958 ); Adolfv. Union Nat'! Life Ins. Co., 101N.W.2d504(Neb. 
1960); Great Southwest Life Ins. Co. v. Henson, 401 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1966). 
61. 382 S.E.2d 421 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). 
62. Id. at 422. 
63. See Temporary Life, Accident, or Health Insurance, supra note 2, at 963. 
64. Legal functionalism, also known as legal realism, is based on the belief that the for-
malist jurisprudential theory of a logical and socially neutral legal framework is rarely attain-
able, and may be undesirable in a changing society, and that the paramount concern of the 
law should not be logical consistency, but socially desirable consequences. Thus, where legal 
formalism is more logically based and precedent-oriented, legal functionalism is more soci-
ologically based and result-oriented. See, e.g., W1LIFRED RuMBLE]R., AMERICAN LEGAL REAL1sM 
(1968); GARY AICHELE, REALISM AND TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1990). 
In the insurance context, legal functionalism is exemplified by the writings and influence 
of Arthur Corbin. Professor Corbin was a major critic of Professor Williston's "plain mean-
ing" analysis of insurance contract interpretation. According to Professor Corbin, "[t]he main 
purpose of contract law is the realization of the reasonable expectations" of the contracting 
parties, and there is "no single rule of interpretation of language, and there are no rules of 
interpretation taken all together, that will infallibly lead to the one correct understanding and 
meaning." 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1 :1, at 53 5 (1993 rev. ed.). See also Swisher, supra note 
59, at 753-58. 
This continuing jurisprudential battle has been described by Professor RobertJerry in this 
way: 
On one side are the formalists or classicists, whose champions are Professor Williston 
and the first Restatement of Contracts. The formalists care mightily about texts and the 
four corners of documents. They believe that words often have a plain meaning that 
exists independently of any sense in which the speaker or writer may intend the words. 
They insist that a court or a party can discern the meaning of contractual language 
without asking about the intentions or expectations of the parties. They contend that 
interpretation is appropriate only if an ambiguity appears on the face of the document .... 
In the world of formalists, an insurer that drafts a clear form should be entitled to rely 
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jected approval-type conditional receipts as providing only illusory cov-
erage, since a life or health insurance applicant would receive nothing of 
value on its issuance, while still having to tender an initial premium pay-
ment. 65 Moreover, approval-type conditional receipts do nothing to vali-
date an applicant's reasonable expectation of coverage.66 
Judge Learned Hand was an early critic of approval-type conditional 
receipts, arguing in the landmark Gaunt v. John Hancock Mutual Life In-
surance Co. 67 that an approval-type application preyed on "persons utterly 
unacquainted with the niceties of life insurance" who would "read it col-
loquially" and reasonably expect coverage. 68 The facts in Gaunt were these: 
After two preliminary interviews, Gaunt signed an application for life in-
surance with John Hancock and paid his first premium. The application 
stated: 
on that form in writing rates without worrying that a court will disregard the finely tuned, 
clear language .... 
The other contestants in the battle for the soul of contract law are the functionalists, who 
are sometimes also labeled as the progressives, the realists, or the post-classicists. The cham-
pions of this side are Professor Corbin and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. The func-
tionalists care less about the text of contracts, believing it to be most useful as an articulation 
of the objective manifestations of the contracting parties and as a means to understanding 
their intentions and [reasonable] expectations .... Text does not have an inherent mean-
ing .... Where a form is standardized, the functionalists substitute objectively reasonable 
expectations for whatever the particular recipient of the form understood, given that the 
recipient has less reason to know what the drafter means, while the drafter has insights into 
what the ordinary, reasonable recipient of the form is likely to understand. 
Robert Jerry II, Insurance, Contract, and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 5 CoNN. INS. 
L.J. 21, 55-56. See also Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Rationales in InsUrance Law: Dusting Off 
the Formal for the Function, 52 Omo ST. L.J. 1037, 1039-58 (1991). 
65. See JERRY, supra note 3, § 33, at 243. 
66. Professor Arthur Corbin's famous first maxim of contract law was: "The Main Pur-
pose of Contract Law is the Realization of Reasonable Expectations Induced by Promises." 
1 CoRBIN ON CONTRACTS§ 1.1 (1952). This reasonable expectations doctrine in insurance 
contract law arguably led to an increased utilization of important insurance law interpretive 
rules in order to determine the parties' intent, contractual duties and obligations, and the 
meaning of disputed terms in an insurance contract through a number of contractually based 
"reasonable expectations" rights and remedies, including (1) the doctrine of ambiguities; 
(2) insurance contract unconscionability and public policy issues; (3) equitable remedies such 
as waiver, estoppel, election, and contract reformation; and (4) a number of other interpretive 
rules applied to standardized insurance contracts as contracts of adhesion. See generally 
Swisher, supra note 59. 
Subsequently, Professor (now Judge) Robert Keeton propounded a "rights at variance with 
the policy language" reasonable expectations doctrine. AI; propounded by Professor Keeton, 
this functionalistic "rights at variance with the policy language" doctrine is based upon a two-
prong rationale: (1) an insurer should be denied any unconscionable advantage in an insurance 
contract and (2) the reasonable expectations of insurance applicants and intended beneficiaries 
regarding the terms of insurance coverage should be honored, even though a painstaking 
study of the policy provisions contractually would have negated those expectations. See Robert 
Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARv. L. REv. 961, 963-64, 
and 83 HARv. L. REv. 1281 (1970). 
67. 160 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849 (1947). 
68. Id. at 601. 
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If the first premium ... was paid when this application was signed, and if the 
Company is satisfied that on the date of the completion of Part B of this 
application [Gaunt's medical examination] [Gaunt] was insurable In accor-
dance with the Company's [underwriting] rules ... and if this application, 
including said Part B, is, prior to my death, approved by the Company at its 
Home Office, the insurance applied for shall be in force as of the date of 
completion of said Part B. ... 69 
Gaunt successfully completed his required medical examination, but be-
fore John Hancock could approve his application, which it undoubtedly 
intended to do, his body was found dead beside a railroad track in South 
Dakota, with a bullet in hjs head. Thus, Gaunt's application was not ap-
proved prior to his death, even though Gaunt was an acceptable medical 
risk, and therefore the insurer's promise to make coverage retroactive to 
the date of Gaunt's medical examination was illusory. 70 
Judge Hand applied the doctrine of ambiguities, or contra proferentem,71 
to this approval-type conditional receipt, and he held that Gaunt's bene-
ficiaries were entitled to coverage: 
the ordinary applicant who has paid his first premium and has successfully 
passed his physical examination, would not by the remotest chance understand 
the clause as leaving him uncovered until the insurer at its leisure approved 
the risk; he would assume that he was getting immediate coverage for his 
money ... The canon contra proferentem is more rigorously applied in insurance 
than in other contracts, in recognition of the differences between the parties 
in their acquaintance with the subject matter ... [I]nsurers who seek to impose 
upon words of common speech an esoteric significance intelligible only to their 
craft, must bear the burden of any resulting confusion.72 
This modern trend that rejects approval-type conditional receipts as pro-
viding only illusory coverage has been followed by a number of courts. 73 
Others, however, have resorted to more questionable interpretive tactics 
in order to validate the applicant's reasonable expectation of coverage by 
finding a "constructive ambiguity" in a life or health insurance conditional 
69. Id. at 599 n.1. 
70. See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, lnterpretatirm or Regulatirm? 2 NEv. L. REv. 312, 
312-14 (2002). 
71. Crmtra proferentem generally holds that whenever an insurance contract is susceptible 
to two or more reasonable interpretations, it will be liberally construed in favor of the insur-
ance applicant or policyholder who is the nondrafting party, and strictly construed against the 
insurer that drafted the language. See generally STEMPEL, supra note 1, § 4.08; KEETON & W1-
01ss, supra note 3, § 2.3; JERRY, supra note 3, § 25A(b). 
72. Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 602 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. 
denied, 331 U.S. 849 (1947). 
73. See, e.g., Puritan Life Ins. Co. v. Guess, 598 P.2d 900 (Alaska 1979); DeFoure v. MFA 
Life Ins. Co., 596 S.W.2d 7 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980); Si!IlSes v. N. Am. Co. for Life & Health 
Ins., 394 A.2d 710 (Conn. 1978); Prince v. W. Empire Life Ins. Co., 428 P.2d 163 {Utah 
1967). 
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receipt, even though no such ambiguity exists in fact. 74 Many commenta-
tors, including Professor Keeton, have criticized this practice: 
To extend the principles of resolving ambiguities against the draftsman in this 
fictional way not only causes confusion and uncertainty about the effective 
scope of judicial regulation of contract terms, but also creates an impression 
of unprincipled judicial prejudice against insurers. 75 
The better reasoned approach, at least for modem functionalist courts, 
would be to openly adopt the reasonable expectations doctrine as a legit-
imate legal theory, rather than attempting to judicially justify some hidden 
agenda by espousing an intellectually unsound argument based upon the 
questionable legal doctrine of a constructive ambiguity. Accordingly, the 
majority of American courts decline to recognize this argument. 
Gaunt definitively set the tone for a majority of American courts to ex-
pressly reject approval-type conditional receipts in favor of interim insur-
ance coverage based upon (1) the application of various reasonable expec-
tation interpretive principles;76 (2) the application of the doctrine of 
ambiguities;77 (3) judicial invoking of public policy and unconscionability 
objections to approval-type conditional receipts;78 or (4) a combination of 
all these factors. In short, after the Gault decision, there has been substan-
tial "judicial restructuring" of the traditional approval-type life and health 
insurance conditional receipt.79 
B. Satisfaction-Type Conditional Receipts 
A "satisfaction" or "condition precedent" conditional receipt constitutes a 
middle-ground doctrine that fairly balances the contractual language with 
the applicant's reasonable expectation of coverage. Under such a condi-
tional receipt, if a life or health insurance company determines that the 
applicant is insurable as a standard risk-normally through a medical ex-
74. See, e.g., Ransom v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 274 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1954); Law v. Ha-
waiian Life Ins. Co., 459 P.2d 195 (Haw. 1969); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lamme, 425 P.2d 346 
(Nev. 1967); Allen v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 208 A.2d 63 8 (N.J. 1965). 
7 5. Keeton, supra note 66, at 97 2. See also Kenneth Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-
Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable F.xpectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REv. 1151, 1154 
( 1981) ("by sometimes finding ambiguities where none apparently existed, courts have avoided 
explaining why an insured's expectations, even though reasonable, should override the lan-
guage of the policy"}; Mark Rahdert, Reasonable F.xpectations Reconsidered, 18 CoNN. L. REv. 
323, 327-33 (1986); Swisher, supra note 64, at 1058-62. 
76. See, e.g., Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 388 A.2d 1346 (Pa. 1978); Quindlen 
v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 342 F. Supp. 9 (WD. La. 1971). 
77. See, e.g., Guess, 598 P.2d at 900; Toevs v. W. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 483 P.2d 682 
(Idaho 1971 ). 
78. See, e.g., Powell v. Republic Nat'! Life Ins. Co., 3 3 7 So. 2d 1291 (Ala. 1976); Statewide 
Ins. Co. v. Dewar, 694 P.2d 1167 (Ariz. 1984); Hemenwayv. MFALife Ins. Co., 318 N.W.2d 
70 (Neb. 1982). 
79. See generally STEMPEL, supra note l, § 3.05[c], at 3-37 to 38. 
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amination of the applicant-then the insurance coverage relates back to 
the date of the application, but if the applicant is deemed not to be a 
standard medical risk, then no contract of insurance ever arises.80 
The rationale underlying this middle ground satisfaction-type condi-
tional receipt was succinctly stated by the Illinois appellate court in Hil-
debrand v. Franklin Life Insurance Co. 81 
Without expressing a view on approval receipts and interim coverage, we con-
clude that an insurance company's good faith rejection of an applicant under 
[a satisfaction-type conditional] receipt may have retroactive effect. This so-
lution "fairly balances the applicant's interest in prompt protection, if available, 
against the insurer's interest in accepting only risks which are insurable under 
its underwriting standards, gives some effect to all the terms used in the binder, 
and does not conflict with past decisions of the Illinois courts."82 
Other advantages that accrue to the applicant from a satisfaction-type con-
ditional receipt analysis are that (1) the life insurance policy becomes in-
contestable sooner; (2) the policy reaches maturity earlier, with a corre-
80. See, e.g., Smith v. N. Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 775 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(applying Wisconsin law); Hildebrand v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 455 N.E.2d 553 (Ill. Ct. App. 
1983); Simpson v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 177 A.2d 417 (Md. 1962); Damm v. Nat') Ins. 
Co., 200 N.W.2d 616 (N.D. 1972); Anderson v. Cont') Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 245 (Okla. Ct. App. 
1983); Grandpre v. Northwestern Nat') Life Ins. Co., 261 N.W.2d 804 (S.D. 1977); Williams 
v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 593 P.2d 534 (Utah 1979). 
See also JERRY, supra note 3, § 33[c], at 243: 
The comlitional binder creates an immediate contract of coverage conditioned upon the 
applicant's insurability, meaning that the coverage does not exist until the insurer is satisfied 
that the risk is acceptable. In a life insurance transaction, for example, this satisfaction will 
ordinarily exist at the time the applicant passes a medical examination .... [t]he conditional 
binder is broader than the approval binder because losses prior to the insurer's expression 
of satisfaction with the insurability of the risk (that is, the "approval") are covered if it turns 
out that the insurer was satisfied with the insurability of the risk. Thus, to continue with 
the life insurance example, if the applicant passes the medical exam but dies before the 
paperwork is processed, the beneficiaries would receive coverage under the conditional 
binder ... 
See also Brown v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 211 N.W.2d 431, 434-35 (Wis. 1973): 
A majority of jurisdictions have held that the language of the conditional receipt clearly 
expresses the intention of the contracting parties. Thus, by applying a strict contractual 
construction, these courts have held that insurability is a condition precedent to the af-
fording of insurance coverage under a satisfaction-type conditional receipt. Thus, a contract 
of insurance is said to arise only upon the insurance company's good faith determination 
that the applicant was insurable as a standard risk at the time of the application. If the 
insurance company determines the applicant insurable as a standard risk, then the insurance 
relates back to the date of the application. If the applicant is deemed uninsurable as a 
standard risk, then no contract of insurance will be deemed to have ever arisen. 
81. 455 N.E.2d 553 (Ill. Ct. App. 1983). 
82. Id. at 563 (quoting Am. Nat'I Bank & Trust Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's 
London, 44 F.2d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 1971)). See also Simpson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 177 A2d 
417, 425 (Md. 1962) (citing a similar rationale for recognizing satisfaction-type conditional 
receipts). 
Insurance Binders Revisited 1031 
sponding acceleration of dividends and cash surrender value; and (3) if the 
insured's birthday falls between the date of the application and the date of 
approval, the premium is computed at the lower rate.83 
Most important, however, a satisfaction-type conditional receipt is able 
to incorporate a traditional plain meaning, Williston approach to insurance 
contract interpretation with a more modern and functionalistic Corbin 
reasonable expectations approach. For example, a widely distributed sam-
ple whole life insurance policy, with a conditional receipt application, 
drafted by the American Council of Life lnsurance,84 is such a satisfaction-
type conditional receipt, and reads, in relevant part: 
CONDmONAL LIFE INSURANCE AGREEMENT 
I. No Insurance Ever in Force. No insurance shall be in force at any time if 
the proposed insured is not an acceptable risk on the Underwriting Date for 
the policy applied for according to [Council Life's] rules and standards .... 
II. Conditional Life Insurance. If the proposed insured is an acceptable risk 
on the Underwriting Date, this insurance shall be in force ... . 
Underwriting Date. The Underwriting Date is the date ... of the application, 
or the date of the medical examination, if required .... whichever is later ... 
. . . NOT A "BINDER"-NO INSURANCE WHERE SECTION I AP-
PLIES-NO AGENT MAY MODIFY85 
The unambiguous plain meaning of this satisfaction-type conditional 
receipt is evident to the insurance applicant and to the court. On one hand, 
this is not a temporary unconditional binder, and it does not provide cov-
erage under section I if the proposed insured is not an acceptable risk under 
Council Life's underwriting rules and standards. On the other hand, this 
satisfaction-type conditional receipt does provide conditional coverage un-
der section II if the insured is an acceptable risk on the underwriting date, 
which is defined as the date of the application or the date of the applicant's 
medical examination, whichever occurs later. And there is no arbitrariness 
of the kind disapproved by Judge Hand in Gaunt. Moreover, the reasonable 
83. See W1NDT, supra note 3, at 289 n.248. 
84. A sample "Council Life Insurance Whole Life Insurance Policy," distributed by the 
Education Services Department of the American Council of Life Insurance, 1850 K Street 
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006, states the following caveat: 
There are no "standard" life insurance policies, and the contracts vacy in wording and 
appearance from company to company. Sometimes there are also significant differences in 
policy provisions. [However] [t]his policy is generally representative of[life insurance] con-
tracts issued in the United States. 
Reprinted in EMERIC FISCHER & PETER SwISHER, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAw, Appendix 
C-1 to C-17 (2d ed. 1994). 
85. Id. at C-15. In the absence of a medical examination, the applicant's medical history 
answers on the application would be detenninative. Id. 
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expectations of the applicant to coverage would anticipate a favorable medi-
cal examination or a medical history report in order to determine the ap-
plicant's risk eligibility; this is a crucial underlying requirement for most 
life and health insurance coverages, and one that the average applicant 
would understand. 
Indeed, Judge Hand had no problem with John Hancock's requirement 
that Gaunt satisfactorily complete a medical examination or, as it turned 
out, two medical examinations as required by the insurer. He took issue, 
not with the conditional medical examination requirement, but with the 
insurer's arbitrary failure to approve this conditional receipt once the medi-
cal examinations were successfully concluded. However, with a satisfaction-
type conditional receipt, no such arbitrary withholding of approval by the 
insurer is possible. 
Thus, a satisfaction-type conditional receipt readily incorporates and 
fairly balances Professor \Villiston's formalistic plain meaning approach to 
insurance contract interpretation with Professor Corbin's functionalistic 
reasonable expectations approach to coverage issues. But this should not 
be all that surprising to modern courts and commentators since 
[a] fair reading of both Williston on Contracts and Corbin on Contracts therefore 
suggest[s] that there are far more similarities than differences in their respec-
tive approaches to contract law in general, and insurance coverage disputes in 
particular. 86 
Consequently, a substantial number of life and health insurers continue 
to employ satisfaction-type conditional receipt language in their applica-
tions, a substantial majority of state insurance commissioners continue to 
approve their forms, and a substantial majority of courts continue to rec-
ognize their validity.87 
C. Unconditional Temporary or Interim Inmrance 
A minority of courts recognize neither approval-type conditional receipts 
nor satisfaction-type conditional receipts. Instead, these courts have held 
that the insured is entitled to unconditional temporary or interim insurance 
until the insurer notifies the applicant that the application has been 
rejected. 88 
86. Swisher, supra note 59, at 755. 
87. See, e.g., Rohde v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 632 F.2d 667 (6th Cir. 1980) (Ohio law); 
Cannon v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 283 A.2d 404 (Md. 1971). See also STEMPEL, supra note l, 
§ 3.05, at 3-36 n.126 ("Many jurisdictions continue to apply the literal language of the various 
insurability receipts, which appear to dominate today's market."). Professor Stempel adds: 
"Approval binders appear to be on the wane, perhaps because insurers have found them 
insufficiently attractive to consumers and also perhaps because state regulators are less in-
clined to approve their use." 
88. See generally JERRY, supra note 3, § 33, at 244-45: 
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The rationale for recognizing unconditional temporary or interim cov-
erage in life and health insurance conditional receipt controversies is based 
on one of three legal arguments: (1) the reasonable expectations of the 
applicant to immediate interim coverage should be honored, even though 
this may not be what the insurer actually intended;89 (2) the insured appli-
cant is covered because the terms of the conditional receipt arguably were 
ambiguous;90 or (3) the terms of an approval- or satisfaction-type condi-
tional receipt are unconscionable and against pubijc policy.91 
The different legal effect of the conditional binder and the unconditional temporary insurance 
binder devolves from the different kinds of conditions that the binders contain. In the con-
ditional binder, the condition to coverage functions as a condition precedent: the insurer need 
not perform its duty (that is, pay proceeds for a loss) unless and until the condition is satisfied. 
In the unconditional temporary binder, the condition to coverage functions as a condition 
subsequent: the insurer has a duty to pay proceeds upon a loss, a duty subject to being 
discharged if the condition is not satisfied. Thus, with the unconditional temporary binder, 
if the insurer ultimately determines that it does not wish to undertake the risk, the insurer 
nevertheless has an obligation to pay proceeds until that determination is made .... In other 
words, coverage under this kind of binder ceases to exist only upon the insurer's communi-
cation to the applicant that the application is being rejected. 
See also KEETON & Wm1ss, supra note 3, at 58-62; STEMPEL, supra note 1, § 3.05, at 3-25 
to 40. 
89. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 681 P.2d 974, 977 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1984) (an insurer that wishes to avoid liability not only must use clear, unequivocal, and 
unambiguous language evidencing its intent to limit temporary coverage, but also must call 
such limiting conditions to the attention of the applicant such that an ordinary layman would 
understand). But see Grandpre v. Northwestern Nat'! Life Ins. Co., 261 N.W2d 804, 808 
(S.D. 1977) (when a conditional receipt stated in boldface letters: "IMPORT ANT: This 
Receipt Does NOT Provide Any Insurance Until After Its Conditions are Met," "the ordinary 
meaning of these words ... would alert any ordinary person to understand what had to be 
completed before the temporary or interim insurance would be effective"); Jacobson v. Kansas 
City Life Ins. Co., 652 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah 1982) (similar holding); Collister v. Nationwide 
Life Ins. Co., 388 A.2d 1346, 1353-54 (Pa. 1978) (though the terms of the life insurance 
application and conditional receipt unambiguously provided that no temporary contract of 
insurance was created, the terms of the contract would be ignored in favor of the insured's 
reasonable expectation of coverage); Gdovic v. Catholic Knights of St. George, 453 A.2d 
1040, 1042 (Pa. Super. Ct.1982) (although the insurer might not have intended to provide 
temporary interim insurance under a conditional receipt application, nevertheless by accept-
ing the applicant's premium, the insurer had the burden to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that the applicant did not have a reasonable expectation and basis for believing that 
he was purchasing immediate interim insurance coverage). 
90. See, e.g., DeFoure v. MFA Life Ins. Co., 596 S.W2d 7, 9-10 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980) 
(conditional receipts are subject to liberal interpretation under the doctrine of ambiguities in 
favor of the insured applicant); Siinses v. N. Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 394 A.2d 710, 
714-15 (Conn. 1978) (a conditional receipt was ambiguous because the applicant could rea-
sonably expect coverage to take effect on a certain date, and the insurer easily could have 
stated in exact language that the life insurance coverage would not take effect until the com-
pany actually determined that the applicant was a standard risk, but the insurer chose instead 
. to use ambiguous language); Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 602 
(2d Cir. 194 7) (Connecticut law), cert. denied, 3 31 U.S. 849 (194 7) (holding that an approval-
type conditional receipt was ambiguous). 
91. See, e.g., Glarner v. Time Ins. Co., 465 N.W2d 591, 595-96 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) 
(provisions in a conditional receipt were ambiguous as to whether it was an approval-type 
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Some scholars support this unconditional temporary or interim insur-
ance rationale when applied to conditional receipt coverage disputes: 
[I]t is arguable that in order to achieve the advantages of a system where people 
are not misled about the coverage provided by the temporary [conditional] 
receipt, it is essential that [all] binders-regardless of their language-be 
treated as unconditional temporary binders. This, it could be argued, fairly 
balances the interests of insurer and applicant. Consumers, at the time they 
submit their applicatjons, desire immediate, permanent coverage, but consum-
ers do not receive this when the insurer uses the language of a [satisfaction] 
or approval binder to give itself the opportunity to investigate the risk before 
committing to permanent coverage. The insurer, on the other hand, desires 
the chance to investigate the risk. ... If the insurer does not wish to be bound 
on the risk, in fairness, the insurer should not issue a binder and should forgo 
receipt of the premium until the policy is delivered .... 92 
It is not correct, however, to say that all binders, regardless of their 
language, should be treated as unconditional temporary binders since a 
further analysis of the three underlying rationales for recognizing uncon-
ditional temporary or interim insurance coverage in life and health con-
ditional receipt controversies demonstrates that unconditional temporary 
insurance coverage in fact does not fairly balance the interests of the insurer 
and the applicant in the vast majority of life and health conditional receipt 
coverage disputes. Let us review these underlying arguments and rationales 
in more detail. 
1. The Reasonable Expectations of the Applicant to Immediate Interim 
Coverage Should Be Honored, Even Though This May Not Be What 
the Insurer Actually Intended 
The first rationale for recognizing unconditional temporary or interim in-
surance coverage in life and health conditional receipt controversies is that 
the reasonable expectations of the applicant to immediate interim coverage 
should be honored, even though this may not be what the insurer actually 
intended. This is largely based upon Professor (now Judge) Robert Kee-
ton's two-prong insurance law doctrine of reasonable expectations: (1) an 
insurer should be denied any unconscionable advantage in an insurance 
contract and (2) the reasonable expectations of the insurance applicants 
conditional receipt or a satisfaction-type conditional receipt, and even if the provisions were 
given the interpretation asserted by the insurer, the conditional receipt was still unconscio-
nable and against Minnesota's strong public policy, which was to recognize the Keeton variant 
of the doctrine of reasonable expectations). 
92. JERRY, supra note 3, § 33, at 248-49 (citing Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 388 
A.2d 1346 (Pa. 1978), and Damm v. Nat'! Ins. Co., 200 N.W.2d 616 (N.D. 1972)). See also 
STEMPEL, supra note 1, § 3.05, at 3-35. 
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should be honored, even though a painstaking study of the policy provi-
sions contractually would have negated those expectations.93 
That an insurer should be denied any unconscionable advantage in an 
insurance contract is an unremarkable proposition. A majority of contem-
porary courts and commentators, whether they be proponents of a for-
malistic or a functionalistic interpretive approach, recognize and apply it 
in resolving insurance coverage disputes.94 
The second principle of Professor Keeton's doctrine of reasonable ex-
pectations has been more controversial: that "the reasonable expectations 
of the insured to coverage should be honored, even though a painstaking 
study of the policy provisions contractually would have negated those ex-
pectations." Severe criticism of Professor Keeton's "rights at variance with 
the policy language" principle has been threefold. First, under this prin-
ciple, the insurance policy need not be interpreted according to its clear 
and unambiguous contractual language, which is anathema to a formalistic 
theory of contract interpretation.95 Second, courts that apply this reason-
able expectations principle have been unable to agree on what factors con-
stitute such a reasonable expectation to coverage and what factors do not.96 
Third, a growing number of courts and commentators have questioned the 
underlying doctrinal justification supporting this interpretive approach.97 
93. See Keeton, mpra note 66, at 963-64. 
94. Swisher, mpra note 59, at 765. 
95. See, e.g., WINDT, mpra note 3, at 376: 
The [Keeton) reasonable expectation rule, therefore, abandons the general contract prin-
ciple that the insured's legitimate expectations are necessarily governed and limited by the 
terms of the policy. That principle will, instead, be applied only when it is fair to do so. As 
a result, in proper cases, an insured may be held to be entitled to coverage despite unam-
biguous language in the policy to the contrary. 
Id. 
96. See, e.g., Rahdert, mpra note 75, at 335: 
The Keeton formula gives no hint at what factors other than the policy provisions courtS 
might use to define the "terms" of the insurance arrangement, or how the courts are to 
measure the force of these external factors against the force of the restrictive policy pro-
visions to determine which should prevail in any given instance. 
Id. 
See also Abraham, mpra note 75, at 1153: 
The courts have employed the expectation principle in cases where the insured's expecta-
tion of coverage was probably real and reasonable. They have also employed it where an 
expectation of coverage was less probable, but the policy's denial of coverage seemed unfair. 
Finally, they have relied on the principle even where an expectation of coverage was im-
probable and the denial of coverage would not appear unfair. In short, the [Keeton] judicial 
concept of an "expectation" of coverage is not a monolithic one. 
Id. 
97. See, e.g., Jeffrey E. Thomas, An Interdisciplinary Critique of the Reasonable &pectations 
Doctrine, 5 CoNN. lNs. LJ. 295, 333 (1998-99) (concluding that the Keeton reasonable ex-
pectations doctrine "rests on dubious assumptions" because "consumer research and empirical 
data tends [sic) to show that the insureds do not rationally evaluate insurance information or 
arrive at specific expectations of coverage"). 
1036 Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Law Journal, Summer 2004 (39:4) 
After more than thirty years of contentious debate, a majority of state 
courts still have neither adopted nor rejected Professor Keeton's doctrine 
of reasonable expectations, but rather have ignored this jurisprudential 
brouhaha.98 Consequently, except for a handful of states,99 the current ju-
dicial trend is to restrict, reject, or basically ignore Professor Keeton's 
"rights at variance" reasonable expectations doctrine. For all practical pur-
poses, it is now a discarded legal doctrine. 
2. The Insured Applicant Is Covered Because the Terms of the 
Conditional Receipt Arguably Were Ambiguous 
A second rationale for recognizing unconditional temporary or interim 
coverage in life and health insurance conditional receipts is that the terms 
of a conditional receipt are ambiguous; they should be construed against 
the insurer and in favor of the insured applicant as the nondrafting party.100 
This contractually based doctrine of ambiguities, or contra proferentem, 
however, is not limited to interim conditional receipt coverage disputes, 
but it also applies to approval and satisfaction-type conditional receipts. 
Most courts widely recognize the doctrine. 101 
Yet an interpretive disparity still exists. Some courts, for example, will 
apply the doctrine of ambiguities strictly against the insurer, irrespective 
98. See Swisher, supra note 59, at 776. As Professor Abraham observes: 
[E)ven in the states where it is in force, the expectations doctrine is static. It is not devel-
oping, evolving, or changing. There are very few if any decisions that apply the doctrine 
in a new way or uncover unrecognized implications of prior applications. On the contrary, 
the expectations doctrine is going nowhere. 
Kenneth S. Abraham, The F.xpectations Principle as a Regulative Ideal, 5 CoNN. INS. L.J. 59, 63 
(1998-99). 
99. See Jeffrey Stempel, Unmet F.xpectations, 5 CoNN. INs. L.J. 181, 193-195 (1998-99) 
(listing states that have adopted the Keeton doctrine). 
100. See, e.g., Puritan Life Ins. Co. v. Guess, 598 P.2d 900 (Alaska 1979); De Foure v. MFA 
Life Ins. Co., 596 S.W.2d 7 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980); Simses v. N. Am. Co. for Life & Health 
Ins., 394 A.2d 710 (Conn. 1978); Toevs v. W. Farm Life Ins. Co., 483 P.2d 223 (Idaho 1971). 
101. See generally STEMPEL, supra note 1, § 4.08; Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance 
Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REv. 531 (1996). Some commentators would like to see the 
doctrine of ambiguities abolished as unfairly slanted in favor of the insured policyholder. See, 
e.g., Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why Insurance Contracts 
Should Not Be Construed Against the Drafter, 30 GA. L. REv. 171 (1995); David S. Miller, Note, 
Insurance as Contract: The Case Against the Ambiguity Rule, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1849 (1987). 
These critics argue that insurance law should be more symmetric and not disfavor the insurer 
as the drafter. 
This criticism is misplaced. Contra proferentem is not peculiar to insurance law but is a well-
accepted principle of general contract law. See ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRAcTs §§ 7. 7-7 .10 
(3d ed. 1999); Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 206 (1981) (recognizing contra proferentem). 
It should continue to play a legitimate role in the resolution of insurance contract disputes. 
See FISCHER, SWISHER & STEMPEL, supra note 12, § 2.05, at 100-102. 
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of whether the insured is a sophisticated policyholder102 or not. 103 Others 
hold that if the policy terms are ambiguous, then extrinsic evidence should 
be permitted to ascertain the parties' intent and contra proferentem should 
be relied upon only as a last resort interpretive tie-breaker. 104 
Regardless of how courts apply the doctrine of ambiguities, however, 
most continue to criticize the "constructive ambiguity" approach of finding 
ambiguities in a life or health insurance conditional receipt, even though 
no such ambiguity exists.105 
Thus, the application of this doctrine is not limited to unconditional 
temporary or interim insurance binders; it also applies to approval-type 
conditional receipts, to satisfaction-type conditional receipts, and indeed 
to the entire panoply of insurance contract interpretive rules and doctrines. 
As Professor Stempel observes: 
Contra proferentem continues to have force when applied to many coverage 
questions because most policyholders are nondrafters who have nothing to say 
about the language of the contract. Consequently, if someone has to lose a 
contract dispute, one can make a good case [that] it should be the nondrafting 
policyholder ... 
The complex nature of insurance, the information disparity between insurer 
and policyholder, the virtual necessity for insurance, and the industry's ability 
to collaborate on contract terms without legal liability (because of the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act's anti-trust exception for insurers) all make modern 
102. A "sophisticated policyholder" is one whose business insurance policies are negotiated 
and drafted on its behalf by sophisticated insurance brokers, risk managers, and/or legal 
counsel. See BARRY OsTRAGER & THOMAS NEWMAN, HANosooK ON INSURANCE CONTRACT D1s-
PUTES 26-36 (9th ed. 1998). See also Jeffrey Stempel, Reassessing the "Sophisticated" Policyholder 
Defense in Insurance Coverage Litigation, 42 DRAKE L. REv. 807 (1993); Hazel Glenn Beh, 
Reassessing the Sophisticated Insured &:ception, 39 ToRT TRIAL & INs. PRACTICE L.J. 85 (2003). 
Not all commercial policyholders are "sophisticated policyholders," however, especially those 
commercial policyholders that use standardized insurance contracts or terms. Id. at 118-119; 
Swisher, supra note 59, at 733-42. 
103. See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Grand Chapter of Phi Sigma Kappa, 651 F. Supp. 
1042 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (applying the doctrine of ambiguities to commercial policyholders as 
well as to ordinary consumers unless the parties possessed equal bargaining power); Outboard 
Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1992) (the sophistication of the 
insured is irrelevant when applying the doctrine of ambiguities). But see E. Associated Coal 
Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 632 F.2d 1068, 1080 (3d Cir. 1980) (Pennsylvania law) ("the 
principle that ambiguities in policies should be strictly construed against the insurer does not 
control the situation where large corporations, advised by counsel and having equal bargaining 
power, are the parties to a negotiated policy"); Eagle Leasing Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 
540 F.2d 1257, 1261 (5th Cir. 1976) (Missouri law). 
This "sophisticated policyholder" interpretive rule normally applies to commercial prop-
erty and casualty business insurance, but it might arguably have application to group life and 
health insurance policies as well. 
104. See, e.g., Rainer Credit Co. v. W. Alliance Corp., 217 Cal. Rptr. 291 (Ct. App. 1985); 
Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Barrett, 847 S.W.2d 125 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). 
105. E.g., Morgan v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 400 P.2d 223 (Or. 1965); Comment, Reasonable 
&:pectations: Contract Ambiguity vs. Arbitrary Application, 34 DRAKE L. REv. 1065 (1985-86). 
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consumer insurance a stronger case for calling close questions in favor of the 
nondrafter than were presented in the customized land lease, sale of goods, 
and shipping contracts, from which the ambiguity doctrine sprang. Thus, the 
implicit rationale of contra proferentem continues with some vigor [in the in-
terpretation of insurance coverage disputes]. 106 
Accordingly, if contra proferentem is used responsibly, it will continue 
to play an important role in resolving coverage disputes and in inter-
preting life and health insurance conditional receipt coverage disputes in 
particular. 107 
3. The Terms of an Approval-Type or Satisfaction-Type Conditional 
Receipt Are Unconscionable and Against State Public Policy 
A third rationale for recognizing life and health insurance conditional re-
ceipts as unconditional temporary or interim insurance is that the basic 
terms of approval-type conditional receipts and satisfaction-type condi-
tional receipts are unconscionable and void as against public policy. 108 
The bedrock rule for unconscionability is found in Restatement (Secontl) 
of Contracts, section 208: 
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made, 
a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of 
the contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application 
of an unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result. 109 
The genesis of this rule is that most insurance contracts, rather than 
being the result of equal bargaining power, are often contracts of adhe-
sion.110 The unconscionability rule therefore states that (1) the insured's 
reasonable expectation to coverage on reading the insurance contract 
should guide that contract's construction and (2) these insurance contract 
provisions should not reach a result that is unconscionable.u1 This uncon-
scionability rule is the outgrowth of general contract law, which has long 
106. Stempel, supra note 33, at 810-11. See also Swisher, supra note 57, at 583-89. 
107. See, e.g., STEMPEL, supra note 1, § 4.08 (defending a restrained use of the insurance 
law doctrine of ambiguities and finding criticisms of contra proferentem to be greatly exagger-
ated); Swisher, supra note 57, at 583-89 (concluding that a continuing role for the doctrine 
of ambiguity in insurance contract disputes is reasonable and appropriate in determining 
insurance policy meaning). 
108. See, e.g., Anderson v. Country Life Ins. Corp., 886 P.2d 1381 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); 
Glamer v. Time Ins. Co., 465 N.W.2d 591 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). 
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 208 (1981). 
110. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lamme, 425 P.2d 346, 347 (Nev. 1967): 
An insurance policy is not an ordinary contract. It is a complex instrument, uriilaterally 
prepared, and seldom understood by the assured. The same is equally true of the conditional 
receipt. The parties are not similarly situated. The company and its representatives are 
expert in the field; the applicant is not. A court should not be unaware of this reality and 
subordinate its significance to strict legal doctrine ... 
111. CoucH ON INSURANCE, supra note 3, § 22: 11, at 22-2 3. 
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recognized that some terms in a contract of adhesion are so one-sided that 
they should not be enforced, even if the parties both were aware of the 
intended effect of these contractual provisions at the time of contracting. 112 
Moreover, as the insurance business is influenced by a strong public 
interest and is heavily regulated through state legislative statutes, judicial 
decisions, and administrative regulations, 113 it is appropriate that public 
policy should play a role. Thus, a determination of whether an insurance 
contract provision is in violation of state public policy is another important 
component found in the doctrine prohibiting unconscionable insurance 
contracts.114 
A number of courts, therefore, have held that since approval-type con-
ditional receipts provide only illusory coverage, they are unconscionable 
and against state public policy. But what about satisfaction-type conditional 
receipts? Are they similarly void? 
In Glarner v. Time Insurance Co., 115 the Minnesota Court of Appeals was 
presented with a health insurance conditional receipt binder that included 
the following provisions: ' 
No insurance will become effective prior to policy delivery. Except, insurance may 
become effective prior to the policy delivery if and when each and every condition 
contained in this receipt is met . .. 
1. The Proposed Insured(s) must be, on the Effective Date ... a risk accept-
able to the Company under its rules, standards and practices for the exact 
policy and premium applied for, without modification. 
3. The policy is issued exactly as applied for within 60 days from the date of 
the application. If the policy is not issued within 60 days from the date of the 
application, then this condition has not been fulfilled and there will be no 
coverage provided under the terms of this conditional receipt ... 116 
This was a unique hybrid situation, in that condition 1 was a satisfaction-
type conditional receipt and condition 3 was an approval-type conditional 
receipt. The court could have found that an ambiguity existed between 
these two inconsistent provisions, or it could have voided condition 3 as 
112. Id. at 22-27. See also HoLMEs' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, supra note 3, § 8.6. 
113. See, e.g., Spencer Kimball & Werner Pfennigstorf, Legislative and Judicial Control of 
the Terms of Insurance Contracts, 39 IND. L.J. 675 (1964); Spencer Kimball & Werner Pfen-
nigstorf, Administrative Control of the Terms of Insurance Contracts, 40 IND. LJ. 143 (1965). 
114. See generally HoLMEs' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, supra note 3, §§ 9.1-9.8; STEMPEL, 
supra note 3, § 4.10. 
115. 465 N.W.2d 591 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). 
116. Id. at 593-94. 
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unconscionable,117 which would have created coverage under the condi-
tion 1 language, because the applicant had taken his medical examination 
and was deemed an acceptable insurable risk under the company's under-
writing guidelines. Instead, the Minnesota appellate court struck down 
both the approval and satisfaction conditional receipt provisions as being 
contrary to public policy: 
Conditional receipts can be categorized into three types. First, the approval 
type provides that the policy takes effect at a certain date, but with the added 
proviso that the application must be accepted by the company. There is no 
contract without company acceptance. Second, the condition precedent type 
of receipt creates an immediate contract, but coverage does not take effect 
until the company is satisfied that the risk is acceptable. The effect of these 
two types of receipts is to offer illusory coverage and to give the company a 
premium for a period of time during which the applicant remains more or less 
uninsured ... 
Even if the clause were given the interpretation asserted by the appellant, 
however, coverage would have to be found in favor of the respondent [appli-
cant] because, as interpreted by the appellant [insurer], the clause is 
unconscionable. 118 
Consequently, Glanzer found temporary interim health insurance coverage 
existed in favor of the insured applicant under the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations. 119 
Assuming that an approval-type conditional receipt does provide illusory 
coverage (and therefore has wisely been rejected in a large number of 
states), why did the Minnesota court also apparently apply this same un-
conscionability test to satisfaction-type conditional receipts that, to date, 
have been upheld as valid by a substantial number of state legislatures, 
insurance commissioners, and judicial decisions? 
State public policy normally is expressed through the legislature and the 
duly authorized state insurance commissioner because a state possesses a 
valid right to regulate the business of insurance for the public good. 120 This 
117. The Glarner court did find that condition 3 was an approval-type conditional receipt 
that provided illusory coverage, and also that there was ambiguous language in the conditional 
receipt application. Id. at 595. 
118. Id. But then, paradoxically, the court implies that satisfaction-type conditional receipts 
would be upheld in Minnesota, citing Wallace v. Time Ins. Co., 387 N.W2d 468, 470 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1986), and stating that "a condition 1 case [a satisfaction-type conditional receipt] 
does not control in this condition 3 case (an approval-type conditional receipt]." Id. at 596. 
119. Id. at 597. 
120. E.g., Cal. State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105 (1951); Swanco 
Ins. Co. v. Hager, 879 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1989). 
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includes the state insurance commissioner's authority to approve policy 
forms and premium rates. 121 
It is true that a state court judge, as well as a state insurance commis-
sioner, also can determine when an insurance policy is unconscionable. 122 
But how far should this judicial discretionary power reach? Should a judge 
give due deference to the prior decisions made by a state insurance com-
missioner regarding whether or not to approve or disapprove certain in-
surance forms in general, and conditional receipt forms in particular, as 
legal formalists generally believe? Or should a judge overtly assert his or 
her co-equal power and authority to declare certain insurance policy forms, 
including conditional receipt forms, to be unconscionable, as legal func-
tionalists generally believe? 
A persuasive approach to this interpretive conundrum can be found Kirk 
v. Financial Securiry Life Insurance Co., 123 where the Illinois Supreme Court 
stated: 
The Director of the Department of Insurance is required by statute to review 
policies of insurance in certain categories and approve or disapprove them, 
based on criteria including the established public policy of this State. 
The approval of [certain language] in policies of insurance by the Department, 
although not conclusive upon the courts, is, however, entitled to great weight 
as against the contention that such a provision is against public policy. 
In our case, pursuant to the command of the legislature, we must assume that 
the Director has reviewed the provisions of the insurance policy in question 
to ascertain whether its provisions were "unjust, unfair, [etc.] or contrary to 
law or to the public policy of this State." The long-established approval of 
[particular provisions] in insurance policies similar to that contained in the 
policy in question, in the absence of any action by the legislature counter-
manding the approval by the Director of such provisions, is strong evidence 
that the General Assembly does not consider the use of such [provisions] vi-
olative of public policy. 
The regulation of insurance has long been the prerogative of the legislature, 
and we should not usurp that authority ... 124 
121. See, e.g., Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Daddy$ Money Inc., 646 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Ct. Civ. 
App. 1982); Minnehoma Ins. Co. v. Okla. State Bd., 562 P.2d 1152 (1977). 
122. See, e.g., L'Orange v. Medical Protective Co., 394 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1968) (Ohio law); 
Sands v. Granite Mut. Ins. Co., 331 A.2d 711 (Pa. 1974). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS§ 208 (1981). See generally Kimball & Pfennigstorf, supra note 113. 
123. 389 N.E.2d 144 (Ill. 1978) (involving time limitation periods for accidental death 
benefits). 
124. Id. at 147-49. 
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Kirk therefore recognized the need to look at prior regulatory precedent 
from the state legislature and from the state insurance director or com-
missioner in approving or disapproving similar insurance forms over a 
long-established period of time, while at the same time recognizing that, 
although not conclusive, this approval or disapproval of insurance forms 
by the state insurance department was entitled to great weight in deter-
mining whether or not such policy provisions were unconscionable and 
void as against state public policy. This important interpretive factor, how-
ever, was basically ignored by the Glarner court, in a decision that effec-
tively circumvented the legitimate power and authority of the Minnesota 
legislature, and the Minnesota insurance commissioner, to approve or dis-
approve insurance policy forms within that state. 
Is there any viable way to provide a legitimate "unconditional" condi-
tional receipt that unambiguously grants the applicant interim life or health 
insurance coverage without the unwelcome possibility that some state court 
judges may overtly extend-and perhaps abuse-their judicial discretion 
in an unwarranted manner while interpreting the validity of life and health 
insurance conditional receipts? Professor Alan Wtdiss suggests that 
[t]he interests of consumers would be ... better served by offering those cus-
tomers who want interim protection the option of buying a temporary life 
insurance policy that would provide protection until either the coverage 
sought by the applicant goes into effect or the individual is notified that the 
application has been rejected. Allowing applicants to decide whether to buy 
such coverage also will create marketing arrangements in which the insurer 
and the applicant have the same actual [or reasonable] expectations about 
whether interim coverage is provided. 125 
But in the absence of a clear and unambiguous conditional receipt pro-
viding interim or temporary coverage to an applicant, the better reasoned, 
and eminently more realistic, approach to life and health insurance con-
ditional receipts is for state courts, state legislatures, and state insurance 
commissioners to disapprove and reject approval-type conditional receipts 
that provide only illusory coverage while continuing to recognize and val-
idate clearly drafted and unambiguous satisfaction-type conditional re-
ceipts that fairly balance the contractual language of a conditional receipt 
with the applicant's reasonable expectation of coverage. 
Thus, except in a relatively small number of states holding that life and 
health insurance conditional receipts constitute temporary interim insur-
ance, 126 satisfaction-type conditional receipts in fact and in law are not un-
125. Widiss, supra note 2, at 1118. 
126. Temporary or interim conditional insurance coverage is sold by various life and health 
insurance companies in selected states, including Alaska, California, Kansas, Nevada, Min-
nesota, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. See FtsCHER, SWISHER & STEMPEL, supra note 12, at 
304. 
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conscionable or void as against public policy, and consequently satisfaction-
type life and health insurance conditional receipts should continue to be 
recognized, validated, and legally upheld in the vast majority of American 
jurisdictions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Insurance binders constitute temporary contracts of insurance until a for-
mal insurance policy can be issued. Although an insurance binder may be 
sketchy, informal, and temporary, it is still an enforceable insurance con-
tract. At a minimum, effective insurance binders expressly or impliedly 
must include the following six elements: (1) an identification of the insured 
and the insurer; (2) if a property insurance binder, a description of the 
property; (3) the policy limits payable on loss; (4) the risks covered; (5) the 
time in which coverage attaches under the terms of the binder; and (6) an 
understanding that subsequent formal policy terms, conditions, and exclu-
sions are incorporated into the binder. Not surprisingly, requirement (6) 
is the source of most insurance binder litigation. 
Property and casualty insurance binders, which are almost always tem-
porary contracts of insurance, may be oral or written, and can be founded 
on the words or deeds of an agent. But although a binder alone is enough 
to establish coverage, "the deal is not completely done until the policy is 
issued." So if loss occurs after an incomplete binder has been issued, but 
before a formal insurance policy has been issued, courts normally will infer 
the "usual terms" of contemplated coverage from "standard form" or "ste-
reotypical" policies utilized by a particular insurer, or by similar property 
or casualty insurance companies. A major problem arises, however, with 
"manuscript form" insurance policies and binders, which do not rely on 
"standard form" or "stereotypical" policy forms; accordingly, in these sit-
uations, there is no policy form standardization and, therefore, the wealth 
of case law may be or limited utility in interpreting manuscript policy lan-
guage after such coverage disputes arise. Consequently, if the parties util-
izing "manuscript form" binders have not agreed on some "draft" or 
"model" underlying policy language for their final manuscript policy, then 
arguably there has been no meeting of the minds, and no valid binder. 
Life and health insurance companies also provide their prospective in-
sureds with various types of binders. Life and health insurance binders, 
however, differ significantly from property and casualty insurance binders 
in that the life and health insurance binders generally only provide con-
ditional coverage rather than binding temporary coverage. There are three 
types oflife and health insurance conditional receipt binders: (1) "approval" 
type conditional receipts, (2) "satisfaction" type conditional receipts, and 
(3) unconditional temporary interim insurance coverage. 
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"Approval" type conditional receipts, once the most common form of 
life and health insurance conditional receipts, have been severely criticized 
by most modem commentators and courts for providing only illusory cov-
erage, and therefore "approval" type conditional receipts have been widely 
rejected by a majority of state courts, legislatures, and state insurance com-
missioners based upon contract ambiguity, unconscionability, and public 
policy grounds. On the other hand, unconditional temporary or interim 
insurance coverage, which is currently recognized in only a small minority 
of states, also has been criticized for providing interim insurance through 
the use of questionable judicial tactics in order to provide interim insurance 
coverage that was never intended by the insurer in the first place. 
The better reasoned majority approach today, however, is for state leg-
islatures, state insurance commissioners, and state courts to recognize, val-
idate, and uphold clearly drafted and unambiguous "satisfaction" type con-
ditional receipts that fairly balance the contractual language of a life and 
health insurance conditional receipt with the insurance applicants reason-
able expectation to coverage. 
